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LEFT OUT IN THE COLD: THE
PROBLEM WITH ABORIGINAL TITLE
UNDER SECTION 35(1) OF THE
CONSTITUTIONA CT, 1982 FOR
HISTORICALLY NOMADIC
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES©
BY BRIAN J. BURKE*
In R. v. Adams and Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,
the Supreme Court of Canada made statements to the
effect that certain historically nomadic Aboriginal
groups may be unable to make out a claim for
Aboriginal title under section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982. In light of the anthropological evidence
relating to the close connection some of these groups
enjoyed with the lands they occupied, a serious injustice
may arise if these groups are indeed barred from an
Aboriginal title claim. The author attempts to correct
this potential injustice by demonstrating that at least
some of these historically nomadic groups could meet
the exclusive occupation test for Aboriginal title
developed in Delgamuukv. As an alternative solution,
the author proposes an additional test to facilitate
proof of Aboriginal title for deserving historically
nomadic groups that might otherwise be precluded
from claiming such title.
Dans les d6cisions R. c. Adams et Delgamuukw c.
Colombie-britannique, la Cour supreme du Canada a
laiss6 entendre que certains groupes historiquement
nomades seraient possiblement incapables de r~clamer
un titre aborigine en vertu du paragraphe 35(1) de ]a
Loi constitutionnelle de 1982. A la lumibre de preuves
anthropologiques supposant des liens proches de ces
groupes aux terres qu'ils occupaient, une grave injustice
serait commise s'ils 6taient incapables de faire une
rdclamation de titre aborigine. L'auteur tente de
corriger cette injustice potentielle en d~montrant qu'au
moins quelques groupes historiquement nomades
pourraient satisfaire a test d'occupation exclusive
6nonc6 dans la decision Delgamuukv pour rclamer un
titre aborigine. En alternative, Iauteur propose un test
additionnel pour faciliter la preuve de titre aborigbne
pour les groupes historiquement nomades m6ritants
qui seraient autrement emplch6s de r6clamer un tel
titre.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a battery of decisions made in the latter half of the 1990s, the
Supreme Court of Canada filled in much of the content of the
"aboriginal rights" protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982.1 Two of the doctrines that have been more fully developed under
this section's rubric are "site-specific Aboriginal rights" and "Aboriginal
title." In brief, a site-specific Aboriginal right confers upon its holder the
right to engage in-in the present day, upon a specific tract of land, and
in its modem form-a practice, custom, or tradition that is proved to
have been, at the time of European contact, integral to the distinctive
culture of the claimant and that took place on the tract of land. By
contrast, Aboriginal title consists of the right to present-day exclusive
1 Being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1982]. Section 35(1) reads as follows: "The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed."
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occupation of land that was exclusively occupied by the claimant group
at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land. In
contradistinction to holders of site-specific Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal
title holders enjoy the right to use the land for a variety of activities, not
all of which need have been practices, customs, and traditions integral to
the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal society in question. Indeed, the
only limitation on the uses to which the land may be put appears to be
something akin to the equitable waste doctrine of real property law.
The purpose of this article is three-fold, and I proceed in the
following manner. First, I will demonstrate that although the Supreme
Court of Canada places both within the general category of "aboriginal
rights" under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the doctrines of
Aboriginal title and site-specific Aboriginal rights are in fact quite
different. The difference, I shall argue, is one of kind, not of degree,
especially in terms of the content of the rights-site-specific rights
conferring only a narrowly circumscribed use of land, as compared to the
nearly unlimited uses available to claimants of Aboriginal title. Second, I
will illustrate how this disparity in the content of the two doctrines may
create a serious injustice for one class of Aboriginal peoples in
particular; namely, certain historically nomadic Aboriginal groups. More
specifically, I shall argue that, under the present doctrine, it is possible
that certain historically nomadic groups will be unable to claim
Aboriginal title over any part of the territories they frequented. If so,
these groups will be confined to the exercise of a number of site-specific
Aboriginal rights upon that territory, provided they can meet the test for
proof of such rights. This outcome may lead to a serious injustice since,
assuming certain patterns of historical use and occupation, there is no
justifiable reason to restrict historically nomadic peoples to the lesser
entitlements of site-specific rights when their more sedentary
counterparts, who did not necessarily enjoy a more intimate connection
with the land, are afforded the opportunity to prove Aboriginal title.
Finally, I will undertake a careful re-examination of the Aboriginal title
doctrine as it should apply to certain historically nomadic Aboriginal
groups, and attempt to refashion parts of the doctrine in order to rectify
this potential injustice facing these groups.
2000]
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II. THE DOCTRINES OF SITE-SPECIFIC ABORIGINAL
RIGHTS AND ABORIGINAL TITLE UNDER SECTION
35(1) OF THE CONSTITUTIONACT, 1982
A. Situating the Doctrines: The Delgamuukw
"Spectrum" ofAboriginal Rights
It will be useful, at the outset, to locate the doctrines of
Aboriginal title and site-specific Aboriginal rights within the broader
framework of the "aboriginal rights" recognized and affirmed under
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The key formulation of this
relationship was set out by Lamer C.J.C., writing for the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada, in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.2 In that
case, Lamer C.J.C. held that the Aboriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by section 35(1) comprise a spectrum in respect of their degree
of connection with the land.
At one end of the spectrum are those Aboriginal rights whose
exercise is not dependent upon any specific piece of land. We might
term such rights "floating, culture-based Aboriginal rights"3 to indicate
this nature. An example would be the right of a successful claimant to
carry a ceremonial weapon in a fashion that the criminal law would
otherwise prohibit. In the middle of the spectrum are "site-specific
Aboriginal rights," so named by the Supreme Court because their
exercise is historically based and dependent upon a particular parcel of
land. These rights enable the holder to enter onto the subject lands for
the purpose of engaging in the specific custom, practice, or tradition
comprising the right. An example might be the right to hunt beaver for
sustenance on a certain tract of shoreline in Algonquin Provincial Park.
At the other end of the spectrum is Aboriginal title, which gives its
holders exclusive occupancy rights and the ability to use the land in
nearly any fashion they desire. An example would be the right of a
successful claimant to the exclusive occupation, and almost unlimited
use, of a specific parcel of land in northern British Columbia.4
This manner of classifying the three types of Aboriginal rights-as
points along a spectrum-seems to assume a gentle gradation of
entitlements, beginning with floating, culture-based rights that have no
2 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw].
3 1 have borrowed this term from Brian Slattery.
4 The above statements are from Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1094-95. The examples provided
are my own.
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connection with the land and ascending to Aboriginal title. A closer
look, though, makes clear that there is more of a "leap" than a gradual
ascension in terms of the benefits conferred by a finding of Aboriginal
title as opposed to the other two rights. To demonstrate this, it is
necessary to summarize the basic elements of the tests for, and contents
of, site-specific Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title.5
B. Site-Specific Aboriginal Rights
For the sake of clarity, the discussion of site-specific Aboriginal
rights below has been divided into two parts: (1) the test for proof of the
right; and (2) the content of the right.
1. The test for site-specific Aboriginal rights
In R. v. Van der Peet,6 Lamer C.J.C. termed the test for proof of a
site-specific Aboriginal right the "integral to the distinctive culture" test.
To satisfy this test, the litigant must do more than demonstrate that the
right claimed was an aspect of his or her Aboriginal society. He or she
must go further and "demonstrate ... that the practice, custom or
tradition was one of the things which made the culture of the society
distinctive-that it was one of the things that truly made the society what
it was." 7
Not all Aboriginal customs, practices, and traditions that took
place on land, then, will constitute site-specific Aboriginal rights. Rather,
only those that are "a defining feature of the culture in question" will
qualify.8 This might be termed the "distinctiveness" element. Chief
Justice Lamer supplies as an example the Musqueam's claim to fish for
food in the case of R. v. Sparrow.9 He notes that "no aboriginal group in
Canada could claim that its culture is 'distinct' or unique in fishing for
5 It will be expedient to omit floating, culture-based rights from our main discussion, since
these are unrelated to the main goal-demonstrating that if certain nomadic peoples are unable to
claim Aboriginal title under the current doctrine, and are thereby restricted to proving entitlement
only to one or more site-specific Aboriginal rights, an injustice will arise. As such, floating, culture-
based Aboriginal rights will hereafter be treated only in passing, when necessary to address them.
6 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van derPeet].
7 Ibid. at 553 [emphasis in original].
8 Ibid. at 554.
9 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter Sparrow].
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food," for this is something common to all cultures throughout the
world.10 However, what the Musqueam claimed in Sparrow was that "it
was fishing for food which, in part, made Musqueam culture what it
is."11 As such, "fishing for food was characteristic of Musqueam culture
and, therefore, a distinctive part of that culture." 12
Chief Justice Lamer also makes clear that, in order to qualify as
an Aboriginal right, the custom, practice, or tradition must have been of
"independent significance" or "integral" to the Aboriginal community
in question; "[i]ncidental practices, customs and traditions cannot
qualify as aboriginal rights through a process of piggybacking on integral
practices ... ."13 What, precisely, does this mean? An example, in site-
specific right terms, might help clarify the point. Suppose an Aboriginal
group could prove that, at the relevant time (which will be discussed
below), it hunted moose each summer upon a tract of woodland in
northern Ontario in order to augment the group's winter food supply.
This activity was proved to have been a distinctive part of its culture-it
partly made the group "what it was." Further, assume that members of
this group, over the years, developed a penchant for picking and
consuming handfuls of blueberries while sojourning along the trails to
the hunting ground. In this scenario, the group might be able to claim a
site-specific right to hunt for moose upon the tract of land, as the
hunting would be "integral"-in the parlance of logic, a necessary
condition-to its distinctive practice of hunting moose. It would likely
not, however, be able to claim a site-specific right to pick blueberries on
the land, for this activity, in the example I have formulated, is surely
incidental to the hunting of moose. In Lamer C.J..C.'s words, the picking
of blueberries cannot piggyback on the integral practice of hunting and
so become a site-specific Aboriginal right. The picking of blueberries
would, therefore, have to be independently proved to have been integral
to the group's distinctive culture in order to become a site-specific right.
The final element of the basic test for site-specific Aboriginal
rights involves the issue of timing. That is, what point in time must the
10 Van der Peet, supra note 6 at 561.
11 Ibid.
1 2 Ibid. [emphasis in original].
13 Ibid. at 560. A narrow exception to this rule appears to have been developed in R. v. Ctdt,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter C6ti]. There, the Supreme Court characterized the right claimed to
be a right to fish for food, despite the fact that the actions of the appellant really involved teaching
younger Aboriginal students the traditional Algonkian practices of fishing for food. The Supreme
Court reasoned, ibid. at 176, that "a substantive aboriginal right will normally include the incidental
right to teach a practice, custom and tradition to a younger generation."
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court look to in examining whether a particular custom, tradition, or
practice was integral to the distinctive culture of the group in question?
Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority in Van der Peet, sets the
time at "the period prior to contact between aboriginal and European
societies." 14 The court must look at this pre-contact period for
identifying Aboriginal rights, Lamer C.J.C. says, "[b]ecause it is the fact
that distinctive aboriginal societies lived on the land prior to the arrival
of Europeans that underlies the aboriginal rights protected by s.
35(1)."1s
In sum, then, for a group to successfully claim a site-specific
Aboriginal right it must prove that (1) prior to the period of contact, a
practice, custom, or tradition taking place on a piece of land was (2)
integral to (3) the distinctive culture of the group in question.
2. The content of site-specific Aboriginal rights
In R. v. Ctd,16 Lamer C.J.C., again writing for the majority of
the Supreme Court, describes the nature of a site-specific Aboriginal
right as "[a]n aboriginal practice, custom or tradition entitled to
protection" and "limited to a specific territory or location." 17 The key
point to note is that this is the only benefit that a site-specific right
confers. In other words, the members of the group are not granted the
right to use land in a manner that goes beyond the exercise, in modern
form, of those customs, traditions, and practices proven to have been
integral to their distinctive culture before the time of European contact.
Returning to my example of the moose-hunting and berry-picking
Aboriginal group, when on the land for the purpose of exercising its
site-specific right to hunt moose, the group will not have the right to pick
and eat the blueberries. Thus, if the land subject to the site-specific right
is privately owned, the owner would be acting lawfully (albeit not
generously) in making it known that members of the group may engage
only in activities comprising the proven right upon the owner's land. If
so, the members of the group could not, without committing an act of
trespass, pick the blueberries. Indeed, in this scenario, group members
could not engage in any activities aside from hunting moose and
14 Van der Peet, supra note 6 at 555.
15 Ibid.
16 Supra note 13.
171bid. at 167.
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activities necessarily incidental to the practice of moose-hunting,18
unless those activities were independently proven to have been integral
parts of the group's distinctive culture prior to the time of European
contact.19
It must also be understood that the exercise of a site-specific
right is confined to the specific parcel of land upon which the custom,
tradition, or activity was historically exercised. This is made clear by
Lamer C.J.C. in R. v. Adams, 20 where he states that "if an aboriginal
people demonstrates that hunting on a specific tract of land was an
integral part of their distinctive culture then ... the aboriginal right to
hunt is ... defined as, and limited to, the right to hunt on the specific tract
of land."21
As will have become apparent, the doctrine of site-specific
Aboriginal rights is quite narrow. The test involves an attempt to strip
the right claimed to its essence, shaving off any part of those practices,
customs, and traditions that cannot be proven to have been integral to
the distinctive culture of the claimant group before European contact.
The content of the right consists of what is left over by this procedure,
albeit exercisable in modem form. These elements stand in high relief to
the more generous doctrine of Aboriginal title, which is examined next.
C. Aboriginal Title
As with the above explication of the elements of site-specific
rights, the following summary examines separately the test for, and
content of, the Aboriginal title doctrine formulated, in large part, in the
Delgamuukw case. 2
18 Activities necessarily incidental to the sife-specific right to hunt moose on the land might
include building tree-mounted hunting stands and erecting campsites.
19 Of course, if the land subject to the site-specific right was, say, public park land, then the
members of the group could engage in any other activities exercisable by the general public upon
the land.
20 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafterAdams].
2 1 Ibid. at 119 [emphasis added].
2 2 Supra note 2.
[VOL. 38 NO. I
Historically Nomadic Aboriginal Peoples
1. The test for Aboriginal title
The test for Aboriginal title can be briefly stated: the claimant
group must establish that it occupied the subject land in an exclusive
fashion at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land. Each
element of this general test demands further elaboration.
First, there is the issue of timing. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C.
holds that the point at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the
land is the relevant time for proof of Aboriginal title, rejecting the "time
of contact" approach used for site-specific Aboriginal rights. His stated
rationale for this difference is that, since "[a]boriginal title is a burden
on the Crown's underlying title," and since "the Crown did not gain this
title until it asserted sovereignty over the land in question," it would "not
make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title
existed." 23 As such, he concludes, the time sovereignty was asserted over
the land is the proper choice.
Next there is the issue of proof of occupancy. Chief Justice
Lamer first notes that "the source of aboriginal title appears to be
grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal perspective on
land," including "their systems of law."24 It follows that, "if, at the time
of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had laws in relation to land, those
laws would be relevant to establishing the occupation of lands which are
the subject of a claim for aboriginal title."2S On the other hand, the
common law perspective must also be taken into account. According to
that perspective, the fact of physical occupation will ground title to the
land. Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, from
the "construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields
to regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting or fishing or
otherwise exploiting its resources." 26 And, in considering whether there
is sufficient occupation to ground title, "one must take into account the
group's size, manner of life, material resources, and technological
abilities, and the character of the lands claimed." 27
It will be recalled that proof of a site-specific Aboriginal right
requires a finding that the practice, custom, or tradition claimed was of
2 3 Ibid. at 1098.
2 4 1bid. at 1099-1100.
2 5 Ibid. at 1100.
26 Ibid. at 1101.
2 7 Ibid. Chief Justice Lamer adopts here a statement made in B. Slattery, "Understanding
Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 758.
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central significance or integral to the claimant's distinctive culture. Does
the doctrine of Aboriginal title also require the group to prove that its
relationship with the land was distinctive to its culture-that it was one
of the things that "made the society what it was"? At first, Lamer C.J.C.
states that the same requirement of distinctiveness indeed operates for
proof of Aboriginal title: "[A] claim to title is made out when a group
can demonstrate 'that their connection with the piece of land ... was of a
central significance to their distinctive culture."' 28 This would seem to
import the "integral to the distinctive culture" test. However, he quickly
retreats from this position:
Although this [requirement that the group prove that its connection with the land was of
central significance to its distinctive culture] remains a crucial part of the test for
aboriginal rights, given the occupancy requirement in the test for aboriginal title, I cannot
imagine a situation where this requirement would actually serve to limit or preclude a title
claim. ... [I]n the case of title, it would seem clear that any land that was occupied
pre-sovereignty, and which the parties have maintained a substantial connection with
since then, is sufficiently important to be of a central significance to the culture of the
claimants. As a result, I do not think it is necessary to include explicitly this element as part of
the test for aboriginal title.2 9
The Supreme Court thus holds that occupation at the time the Crown
asserted sovereignty over the land (if such occupation was exclusive, as
will be discussed below) is a sufficient proxy for proving that the land
was of central significance to the distinctive culture of the group in
question.
The final part of the test for Aboriginal title is proof that the
group's occupation of the land was, at the time sovereignty was asserted,
exclusive. Once again, the concept of exclusivity must be grounded in
both the common law and the Aboriginal perspective; it would not be
fair to define exclusivity strictly in terms of the rights flowing from fee
simple ownership. As such, the test "must take into account the context
of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty." 30 Hence, a proved
intention to retain exclusive control might be sufficient to meet the test,
even if there was not de facto exclusivity in occupation 3 1
In sum, then, proof of Aboriginal title requires that the claimant
group prove that (1) at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty over the
land, the group (2) occupied the land in (3) an exclusive manner.
2 8 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1101.
2 9 Ibid. at 1101-02 [emphasis added].
30 Ibid. at 1104.
31 Ibid.
[VOL 3"8 NO. 1
2000] Historically Nomadic Aboriginal Peoples 11
2. The content of Aboriginal title
It has long been established that, because of the sui generis
nature of Aboriginal title, land held pursuant to such title is inalienable
to any party except the Crown.32 Aside from this point, what comprises
the actual content of Aboriginal title? In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C.
states that the content of Aboriginal title may be summarized by two
propositions: first, "aboriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive
use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of
purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices,.
customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive aboriginal
cultures;" and second, "those protected uses must not be irreconcilable
with the nature of the group's attachment to that land."33 Thus, subject
to any uses irreconcilable with the attachment to the land-also
described as "inherent limits"-a group holding Aboriginal title to land
may do virtually anything upon it.34
What are these "inherent limits" upon the claimant group's
otherwise carte blanche right to make such use of the land as it wishes?
Although Lamer C.J.C. wavers on this issue to some degree, he appears
to conclude that the inherent limits of Aboriginal title can be analogized
to the concept of equitable waste. The rule against equitable waste is
simply the restriction upon a life tenant not to commit "wanton or
extravagant acts of destruction" on the land.35
32 A recent expression of this principle can be found in Delgamuukwv, ibid. at 1081-82.
3 3 Ibid. at 1083.
34 Chief Justice Lamer says in Delgamuukav, ibid. at 1091: "The approach I have outlined
above allows for a full range of uses of the land, subject only to an overarching limit, defined by the
special nature of the aboriginal title in that land." I say title-holders may do "virtually" anything
upon the land, because Aboriginal title-holders' use of the land would also be constrained by some
of the same laws governing non-Aboriginal title-holders' use of their land: nuisance laws,
environmental protection legislation, et cetera.
3 5 Ibid. at 1090. Chief Justice Lamer initially states, ibid. at 1089, that an Aboriginal group may
not use Aboriginal title lands in a manner incompatible with the historical occupation proved, and
then immediately thereafter, at 1090, posits the equitable waste analogy. That the latter, less
restrictive rule is probably the proper explanation of the limit is made clear by his statement at 1090-
91: "[T]he limits imposed by the doctrine of equitable waste capture the kind of limit I have in mind
here." However, see W. Flanagan, "Piercing the Veil of Real Property Law: Delgamuukw v. British
Columbia" (1998) 24 Queen's L.J. 279 at 313-14, for an argument that the doctrine of inherent
limits on Aboriginal title formulated in Delgamuulkv is muddled to the point of contradiction. For a
more general argument that placing inherent limits on Aboriginal title contravenes principles of
equality, see R.H. Bartlett, "The Content of Aboriginal Title and Equality Before the Law" (1998)
61 Sask. L. Rev. 377.
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In sum, Aboriginal title confers upon its holders the right to use
the land in any manner they wish, subject to the inherent limits attached
to that title. These inherent limits, though, are quite narrow. They
appear to amount merely to the rule thaf a group holding Aboriginal
title may not treat the land in such a fashion as to ruin its use for future
generations.
D. A Comparison of the Key Elements of the Two Doctrines, and a
Possible Explanation as to Why the Doctrines Differ So Greatly
From the foregoing summary, it is clear that the doctrines of
site-specific Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title are very different in
nature. This section will compare some of the key elements of the two
doctrines and suggest an explanation as to why the Supreme Court
would formulate them in such a disparate fashion.
The most obvious difference between the two doctrines is how
restrictive the doctrine of site-specific rights is when compared to the
doctrine of Aboriginal title. Why would the Supreme Court formulate
such a strict test, which confers so little? A possible answer is to be found
in a statement made by Lamer C.J.C. in Van derPeet:
Aboriginal rights are not general and universal; their scope and content must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. The fact that one group of aboriginal people has an
aboriginal right to do a particular thing will not be, without something more, sufficient to
demonstrate that another aboriginal community has the same aboriginal right. The
existence of the right will be specific to each aboriginal community.
36
What does Chief Justice Lamer mean by this statement? A good
argument can be made that he means that a court should not view
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as guaranteeing natural rights
that enure to the benefit of all Aboriginal groups. The natural rights
view (or at least one version of it) would be that, without having to
examine the anthropological evidence surrounding a particular group's
customs, practices, and traditions, practical reason can determine the
rights that inhere in the group. A natural rights proponent would argue
that once these inherent rights are identified, they should be the ones
that section 35(1) recognizes and affirms.
The Supreme Court, though, rejects this view from the outset.
This is not wholly surprising. As demonstrated by Lamer C.J.C.'s
statement, courts are wary of explicitly making law by way of natural
rights reasoning, preferring instead the more staid tools of precedent
36 Van der Peet, supra note 6 at 559.
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and argument by analogy. Further, the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms37 can be seen as a document enshrining the basic natural rights
of all Canadians; the universal "all" including, of course, Aboriginal
peoples. As such, a relevant question would be: what would section 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982-from a natural rights perspective-have to
add to the rights already protected by the Charter?38 For example, if we
say that one natural right inhering in Aboriginal peoples is the freedom
to engage in religious ceremonies, we are faced with the objection that
rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression are already
countenanced, and enure to the benefit of all Canadians, under sections
2(a) and (b), respectively, of the Charter. The same might be said for
many other natural rights.39 In any event, regardless of the merits and
demerits of adopting a natural rights view of the matter, this approach is
rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada.
But if Aboriginal rights under section 35(1) are not to be
determined "in the abstract," and if they must somehow be distinct from
the basic rights guaranteed to all Canadians under the Charter, then
there must be some means chosen to restrict and define their content.
The Supreme Court accomplishes this objective by introducing the
"integral to the distinctive culture" test. This test, which applies to both
floating, culture-based rights and site-specific rights, essays to determine
the "essence" of the Aboriginal group's culture, and to provide
protection for only those practices, customs, and traditions that
constitute this essence. It is in an attempt to arrive at this essence, too,
that the Supreme Court sets the time for proving these Aboriginal rights
at the point before European contact. This requirement works to ensure
that only "pure" Aboriginal customs, traditions, and practices-not
those arising after European contact-are protected by section 35(1)'s
floating, culture-based and site-specific rights doctrines.
The problems with such an approach are readily apparent. First,
the question of what constitutes a thing's "essence" has eluded
metaphysicians for centuries, if not millennia. Moreover, in the context
37 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
38 This very point is picked up by the Supreme Court in Van derPeet, supra note 6 at 534.
39 A sophisticated version of a natural rights analysis could respond to such objections. It
might begin by positing some rights applicable to all humans, and from these derive rights more
particular to Aboriginals, focusing on their "Aboriginality." Such an analysis, however, is beyond the
purview of this article. Readers interested in a thoughtful formulation of a natural rights position
are encouraged to examine James Anaya's argument that self-determination is a natural right
inhering in Aboriginal groups: see J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996) at 75-77.
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of Aboriginal rights, attempting to carve out the essence of a group's
many practices, customs, and traditions and confer only this excised
piece as the right seems unduly restrictive. This point is made by
L'Heureux-Dub J. in her dissent in Van der Peet, where she states that
this "strict construction of the constitutionally protected aboriginal rights
flies in the face of the generous, large and liberal interpretation of s.
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 advocated in Sparrow."40
The doctrine of Aboriginal title, by contrast, is not weighed down
by the restrictive test and narrowly circumscribed benefit comprising the
doctrine of site-specific Aboriginal rights. Why is this the case? That is,
why are the two doctrines-both placed under the rubric of section
35(1)'s "aboriginal rights"-so disparate? I suggest that the difference is
the result of a methodological difficulty that the Supreme Court faced
when it came to fleshing out the meaning of Aboriginal title. Specifically,
it would appear difficult to import the doctrines surrounding site-specific
rights into the Aboriginal title analysis and still end up with the desired
result; namely, that the successful Aboriginal title claimant be granted
an almost unfettered use of the land.
This methodological difficulty is hinted at by Lamer C.J.C. in
Delgamuukw.41 There, he speaks of the argument urged upon the
Supreme Court in Adams42 that Aboriginal rights are "fragments of a
broader claim to aboriginal title."43 This, says Lamer C.J.C., would imply
that "aboriginal rights must rest ... in ... the unextinguished remnants of
title," and that "[t]aken to its logical extreme, this suggests that aboriginal
title is merely the sum of a set of individual aboriginal rights, and that it has
no independent content."44 This argument might aptly be termed the
"bundle theory" of Aboriginal title, borrowing from L'Heureux-Dub6
J.'s statement in Van der Peet that "aboriginal title exists when the bundle
40 Van der Peet, supra note 6 at 592. For additional criticism of the "integral to the distinctive
culture" test, see J. Borrows, "The Trickster: Integral to a Distinctive Culture" (1997) 8 Const.
Forum 27; L.I. Rotman, "Hunting for Answers in a Strange Kettle of Fish: Unilaterism, Paternalism
and Fiduciary Rhetoric in Badger and Van der Peet" (1997) 8 Const. Forum 40 at 42-43; R.L. Barsh
& J.Y. Henderson, .'The Supreme Court's Van der Peet Trilogy: Na'ive Imperialism and Ropes of
Sand" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993 at 999-1002; and C. Bell, "New Directions in the Law of Aboriginal
Rights" (1998) Can. Bar Rev. 36 at 47.
41 Supra note 2.
4 2 Supra note 20.
4 3 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1093.
44 Ibid. [emphasis added].
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of aboriginal rights is laige enough to command the recognition of a sui
generis proprietary interest to occupy and use the land. "45
Chief Justice Lamer, however, writing for the majority in
Delgamuukw, rejects the bundle theory in favour of a radically different
notion of Aboriginal title. The reason for this seems clear. If Aboriginal
title consisted, as the Crown argued, merely of "the right to exclusive use
and occupation of land in order to engage in those activities which are
aboriginal rights themselves,"46 then it would be impossible to confer on
Aboriginal title claimants a wide-ranging use of the land. That is,
because the "integral to the distinctive culture" test for site-specific
Aboriginal rights is so limiting, a group restricted to exercising only
site-specific rights on the title land would be unable to function for any
extended period of time. For example, if the group could prove, using
the "integral to the distinctive culture" test, the right to fish, hunt, pick
berries, and cook game on the land, and this became the substance of its
Aboriginal title claim, what would occur when a member of the group
wanted to wash him or herself in a river? Under this formulation, the
title-holder would be unable to do so unless washing, too, could be
proved to have been an integral part of the group's distinctive culture at
the time before European contact. The same holds true for any number
of other activities, both the extravagant and the necessary: opening and
running a restaurant, sleeping on the ground, and watching a
video-cassette recording. The point is that it is impossible to take a
number of site-specific Aboriginal rights, no matter how many, "add
them up" in the literal sense, and arrive at the "any use except inherent
limits" result reached by the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw. There
would be too many gaps in the activities the Aboriginal group in
question could undertake.
It seems that as a result of this methodological problem-that is,
to avoid the existence of gaps in the title that would diminish the
enjoyment of the claimant Aboriginal group-the Supreme Court found
it necessary to reject the "integral to the distinctive culture" test in
favour of the less restrictive "exclusive occupation" test for proof of
Aboriginal title. And, when this latter test is adopted, there is no reason
for the timing requirement to be set at European contact because, unlike
under the doctrine of site-specific Aboriginal rights, there is no need to
attempt to carve out the "essence" of the Aboriginal group's culture,
which in turn requires the court to examine it in its "pure" (i.e.,
45 Van der Peet, supra note 6 at 580 [emphasis added].
46 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1080.
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pre-contact) form. Indeed, this search for essences would give rise to the
exact methodological problem described above.
All of this points to the following conclusion: despite the fact
that the Supreme Court describes site-specific Aboriginal rights and
Aboriginal title as proximate points along a spectrum, they are, in
actuality, very different doctrines. The purpose of this article is not,
however, to undermine the doctrines of Aboriginal title and site-specific
Aboriginal rights in their entirety. The Supreme Court's effort in this
string of cases, spearheaded by Lamer C.J.C., constitutes a noble
attempt to flesh out the content of section 35(1) in a manner that
reconciles the rights of Aboriginal peoples with those of the rest of
Canadian society. And the fact that the spectrum analogy is somewhat
misleading is not, in itself, a fatal flaw in the section 35(1) jurisprudence;
it merely underscores the methodological difficulties that the Supreme
Court faced. Moreover, the radical difference in the nature of the
benefit conferred by site-specific rights versus Aboriginal title will not
necessarily work an injustice. For example, it is arguable that an
Aboriginal group that infrequently exercised only a few customs,
traditions, or practices upon a certain tract of land should not be entitled
to a declaration that it now "owns" the land and can perform almost any
activity it wishes upon it. At the very least, it is clear that this group
would be less deserving of such a declaration than a group that inhabited
a piece of land for many decades, performing both its mundane and its
sacred activities upon the soil. In such a scenario, restricting the former
group to one or more site-specific rights seems like an equitable
conferral.
Thus, so long as groups that should be able to claim Aboriginal
title can claim Aboriginal title, the disparity between the doctrines will
not create a problem. But if there are groups that, though deserving of
Aboriginal title, are unable to make out such a claim under the doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court, then the difference between the
benefits conferred following a finding of Aboriginal title as compared to
those following a finding of a site-specific right or rights creates a real
problem. That is, because the benefits flowing from a site-specific right
are so much more restrictive than those flowing from Aboriginal title, an
injustice may arise if a group that should be entitled to a declaration of
Aboriginal title cannot, because of a gap in that doctrine, claim under it.
Is there such a gap in the doctrine of Aboriginal title? Are there groups
that, despite being worthy claimants of Aboriginal title, will be restricted
from proving it, and therefore unfairly left to claim only the
dramatically-reduced entitlements flowing from site-specific rights?
Certain statements by the Supreme Court concerning historically
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nomadic Aboriginal peoples indicate that these groups might fall into
this category. It is to their situation that we shall now turn.
III. HOW THE POTENTIAL "GAP" IN THE DOCTRINE OF
ABORIGINAL TITLE MAY CREATE AN INJUSTICE FOR
CERTAIN HISTORICALLY NOMADIC GROUPS
This part of the article examines the potential difficulties that
certain historically nomadic groups could face in proving a claim to
Aboriginal title. I begin by examining some of the Supreme Court of
Canada's pronouncements concerning Aboriginal title and nomadic
peoples. Thereafter, the situation of two different types of nomadic
groups is addressed in light of the Supreme Court's comments.
A. Pronouncements by the Supreme Court of Canada Regarding
Nomadic Groups and Aboriginal Title
In Adams,47 Lamer C.J.C., writing for the majority of the
Supreme Court, spends some time explaining the difference between
Aboriginal title and site-specific Aboriginal rights. He makes clear that,
in his formulation of these doctrines, the latter should not be perceived
as being grounded in the former.48 He underscores this point with the
following statement:
To understand why aboriginal rights cannot be inexorably linked to aboriginal title it is
only necessary to recall that some aboriginal peoples were nomadic, varying the location of
their settlements with the season and changing circumstances. That this was the case does
not alter the fact that nomadic peoples survived through reliance on the land prior to
contact with Europeans and, further, that many of the practices, customs and traditions
of nomadic peoples that took place on the land were integral to their distinctive cultures.
The aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) should not be understood or
defined in a manner which excludes some of those the provision was intended to
protect.
49
This seems to be a clear suggestion that certain nomadic Aboriginal
peoples-defined by Lamer C.J.C. as groups "varying the location of
4 7 Supra note 20.
48 Interestingly, this is the converse of Lamer C.J.C.'s earlier statement that Aboriginal title
should not be seen as merely the sum of a set of Aboriginal rights (what I have termed the "bundle
theory").
49 Adams, supra note 20 at 118 [emphasis added].
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their settlements with the season and changing circumstances"-will not
be able to make out a claim for Aboriginal title.
Immediately following this comment in Adams, Lamer C.J.C.
makes another statement concerning a different kind of Aboriginal
peoples:
Moreover, some aboriginal peoples varied the location of their settlements both before
and after contact. ... That this is the case may (although I take no position on this point)
preclude the establishment of aboriginal title to the lands on which they settled; however,
it in no way subtracts from the fact that, wherever they were settled before or after
contact,prior to contact [they] engaged in practices, customs or traditions on the land which
were integral to their distinctive culture.50
This comment casts doubt upon the ability of a different class of
Aboriginal persons, albeit one that might also be fairly termed
"nomadic," to claim Aboriginal title; namely, those groups that moved
the location of their settlements at different points in time.
Anthropological evidence demonstrates that, historically, there
existed Aboriginal groups fitting into both of these categories. The
Micmac fit into what Lamer C.J.C. describes as a group varying the
location of its settlement with the season and changing circumstances.
The Algonkians of Central Ontario and the Iroquoians of what is now
Quebec City fit into the second category: groups that moved their
settlements infrequently, after a substantial period of sedentary living.
The position of both types of groups will be examined next.
B. "Infrequent Movers". The Algonkians and the Iroquoians
Aboriginal groups falling intoAdams's second category-peoples
that moved the locations of their settlements infrequently-are, for
reasons that will be made clear, in less danger of being unable to prove
Aboriginal title. Since they constitute the less contentious case, these
groups will be treated first.
50 Ibid. [emphasis in original]. Chief Justice Lamer's reference to movement of the settlements
before and after contact-not before and after Crown sovereignty was asserted-must be
understood in light of the circumstances in which his statement was made. First, the point of this
passage was to emphasize the importance of Aboriginal rights other than Aboriginal title (i.e.,
site-specific and floating, culture-based rights). The period before contact is, of course, the relevant
time for establishing these rights. Second, it must be recalled that when this passage was written
Delgamuukw had not been decided. As such, it had not yet been established that it is the time of
Crown sovereignty, not contact, that must be looked to in adjudicating the Aboriginal title claim. In
light of Delgamuukw, though, it is clear that the issue to be considered is a group's movement of its
settlement post-sovereignty, not post-contact. It is this issue, therefore, that I treat in this part of the
article.
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According to anthropologists, the Iroquoians of present-day
Quebec City and the Algonkians of Central Ontario are prominent
candidates for Adams's second category. Mary Druke Becker, in her
treatment of the Iroquoians in early post-contact times, states that "[tjhe
Iroquoian-speaking peoples lived primarily in sedentary villages that
were moved every ten to twelve years when conditions (e.g., soil
exhaustion) warranted."51
With respect to the Algonkians of Central Ontario, there has
been a rather lively debate in the anthropological literature as to the
land-possession patterns of Algonkian families in respect of what Frank
Speck and Loren Eiseley originally termed "family hunting territories."5 2
The accepted theory appears to be that, certainly post-contact and most
probably pre-contact, Algonkian families owned (under Algonkian laws
and customs) and occupied tracts of land over which they hunted. Of
special importance to us is the relatively recent addition to the
anthropological study of the Algonkian family hunting groups provided
by Adrian Tanner. He points out that "recent data showed cases where
[the family hunting] territories appeared to "move" over a period of time
... onto unused adjacent land," with the result that "if maps of the
territories of a single family are compared over time, a major shift may
appear to have taken place."5 3
The issue for us, of course, is whether Aboriginal groups like the
Algonkians and Iroquoians-groups whose settlements moved over
time-would be precluded from claiming Aboriginal title as a result of
post-sovereignty movement of their settlements. Before we can examine
the effect of post-sovereignty settlement movements, though, a
preliminary question must be addressed: could at least certain of the
groups under consideration indeed establish exclusive occupation of
their lands at the time Crown sovereignty was asserted? To answer this
question, take, for example, a group with land-use patterns similar to the
Iroquoians. Druke Becker's research establishes that the Iroquoians
engaged in a sedentary lifestyle for substantial periods of time,
establishing permanent village sites. This would probably suffice to
51 M. Druke Becker, "Iroquois and Iroquoian in Canada" in R.B. Morrison & C.R. Wilson,
eds., Native Peoples: The Canadian Experience, 2d ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995) 323 at
326 [emphasis added].
52 F.G. Speck & L.C. Eiseley, "Significance of Hunting Territory Systems of the Algonkian in
Social Theory" (1939) 41 American Anthropologist 269. See also J.M. Cooper, "Is the Algonquian
Family Hunting Ground System Pre-Columbian?" (1939) 41 American Anthropologist 66.
53 A. Tanner, "The Significance of Hunting Territories Today" in B.A. Cox, ed., Native People,
Native Lands: Canadian Indians, Inuit and Mitis (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1987) 60 at 63
[emphasis added].
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establish the occupation component under the exclusive occupation test,
since Lamer C.J.C. expressly mentions the construction of dwellings as
one indicia of occupation. Assuming that the group's occupation of the
land was exclusive, it seems that the group would indeed be able to
establish exclusive occupation-and thus Aboriginal title-to the land at
the time of Crown sovereignty.
Having addressed this preliminary point, we come to the central
question: assuming that a certain group could establish exclusive
occupation (and thus a right to Aboriginal title) at the time of
sovereignty, would movement of the group's settlement post-sovereignty
somehow abolish its Aboriginal title? To help visualize the situation,
posit a hypothetical Aboriginal 'group that had its settlement at
co-ordinates A, B at the time sovereignty was asserted (which we will call
"Settlement 1"), and then moved its settlement post-sovereignty to
co-ordinates C, D ("Settlement 2"). There are two possible scenarios to
consider. First, Settlement 2 might be located within the Aboriginal
group's territory.5 4 Movement of a group's settlement post-sovereignty
to another location within its own territory would clearly not affect its
Aboriginal title, since at all times the group would remain within the title
lands. The second scenario is the potentially problematic one. In this
scenario, Settlement 2 is located outside the territory the group
exclusively occupied at the time Crown sovereignty was asserted. Would
movement to Settlement 2, under these circumstances, abolish the
group's Aboriginal title to the land?
It will be recalled that, in Adams, Lamer C.J.C. states that while
a group's movement of the location of its settlement before and after
contact may preclude proof of Aboriginal title, he takes no position on
the point.5 5 In his later judgment in Delgamuukw, he makes the
following comment with respect to post-sovereignty changes in the
nature of occupation:
I should also note that there is a strong possibility that the precise nature of occupation
will have changed between the time of sovereignty and the present. I would like to make
it clear that the fact that the nature of occupation has changed would not ordinarily
preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the
people and the land is maintained.56
54 This would mean, of course, that the group's settlement was not co-extensive with its
territory. More specifically, it means that the group's territory (the entirety of the lands the group
occupied) was larger than its settlement (the group's village site). This seems to be an accepted
usage of these terms.
5 5 See note 50, supra, and accompanying text.
5 6 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1103.
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This statement is somewhat cryptic, but it is at least arguable that by
referring to a change in the "precise nature of occupation," Lamer
C.J.C. is speaking of a post-sovereignty shift of a group's settlement to a
location outside of its pre-sovereignty territory.5 7 If this is a correct
interpretation, then, according to Lamer C.J.C., such a shift would not
act to preclude a claim for Aboriginal title.
A clearer statement in this regard is made by La Forest J. in
Delgamuukw (with whom L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurred). His statement
is highly relevant to our issue, and is worth quoting in full:
[T]he aboriginal right of possession is based on the continued occupation and use of
traditional tribal lands. The Chief Justice concludes that the relevant time period for the
establishment of "aboriginal title" is the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty
over the affected land. I agree that in the context of generalized land claims, it is more
appropriate, from a practical and theoretical standpoint, to consider the time of
sovereignty as opposed to the time of first contact between an aboriginal society and
Europeans. However, I am also of the view that the date of sovereignty may not be the
only relevant moment to consider. For instance, there may have been aboriginal
settlements in one area of the province but, after the assertion of sovereignty, the
aboriginal peoples may have all moved to another area where they remained from the
date of sovereignty until the present. This relocation may have been due to natural
causes, such as the flooding of villages, or to clashes with European settlers. In these
circumstances, I would not deny the existence of "aboriginal title" in that area merely
because the relocation occurred post-sovereignty. In other words, continuity may still
exist where the present occupation of one area is connected to the pre-sovereignty
occupation of another.58
This passage reflects a very sensible approach to the issue of
post-sovereignty movement of an Aboriginal group's settlement. Indeed,
any other approach would be manifestly unfair to Aboriginal groups that
engaged in such movements.
One final point remains to be resolved. What land should
comprise the Aboriginal title grant for a group whose settlement shifted
over time-the pre-sovereignty territory, or the post-sovereignty
territory? In the passage quoted above, La Forest J. implies that the
post-sovereignty territory would constitute the title lands. This seems to
be a good result, given that the present-day members of the group would
probably have a closer connection to the post-sovereignty land. What if,
however, the post-sovereignty land was either substantially larger or
substantially smaller than the pre-sovereignty land? How might a fair
solution be reached in these cases? I would suggest that, in this regard,
57 Another possible interpretation is that the chief justice is referring to the nature of an
Aboriginal group's post-sovereignty occupation of the same parcel of land it occupied pre-
sovereignty.
58 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1129-30 [emphasis in original].
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La Forest J.'s general comments in Delgamuukw concerning the
Aboriginal title territory to be granted are apposite:
[Tjhe general boundaries of the occupied territory should be identified. I recognize,
however, that when dealing with vast tracts of territory it may be impossible to identify
geographical limits with scientific precision. Nonetheless, this should not preclude the
recognition of a general right of occupation of the affected land. Rather, the drawing of
exact territorial limits can be settled by subsequent negotiations between the aboriginal
claimants and the government. 59
Negotiation between the Aboriginal group claiming the title and the
government would appear to be an appropriate way to define the
territorial limits in these cases.
In sum, it is most probable, notwithstanding some earlier hints to
the contrary in Adams, that Aboriginal groups whose settlements shifted
post-sovereignty would not be barred from proving Aboriginal title to
land. As a result, they likely do not fall into what I have called the gap in
that doctrine. The situation with respect to groups in Adams's first
category of nomadic peoples, seasonally-nomadic groups, 60 may be quite
different. In the next section, we shall see that they are perilously close
to the edge of, if not certainly relegated to, this gap in Aboriginal title.
C. Seasonally-Nomadic Groups: The Micmac of the Atlantic Provinces
The other class of nomadic peoples described by Lamer C.J.C. in
Adams are those groups that varied the location of their settlements with
"the season and changing circumstances." A large number of
anthropological works point to the Micmac as one such group. Leslie
Upton claims that, in the early post-contact period, the Micmac "moved
with the seasons in a regular cycle," based wholly on the need to satisfy
their food requirements.6 1 Both Allan McMillan and Virginia Miller
describe a similar pattern of seasonal mobility during the early
59 1bid. at 1129.
60 It is to be understood that the term "seasonally-nomadic groups" may be employed in two
different contexts in this article: (1) as the claimants of Aboriginal title-that is, the descendants of
seasonally-nomadic peoples; and (2) as the ancestors of the claimants, at whom the court will look
in analyzing the Aboriginal title claim. The descendants of such groups may no longer-indeed,
probably do not-participate in a seasonally-nomadic style of living.
61 L.F.S. Upton, Micmacs and Colonists (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press,
1979) at 2-3.
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seventeenth century. 62 All of these anthropologists appear to agree that
the movements of the Micmac were not arbitrary. Instead, the groups
frequently returned to good camp sites year after year.63
The issue, again, is whether these groups would be precluded
from establishing Aboriginal title as a result of their seasonal nomadism.
In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. reaffirms his position in Adams on this
matter. He says:
Because aboriginal rights can vary with respect to their degree of connection with the
land, some aboriginal groups may be unable to make out a claim to title, but will
nevertheless possess ... site-specific rights to engage in particular activities. As I
explained in Adams, this may occur in the case of nomadic peoples who varied "the location
of their settlements with the season and changing circumstances."... The fact that aboriginal
peoples were non-sedentary, however ... does not alter the fact that nomadic peoples
survived through reliance on the land prior to contact with Europeans and, further, that
many of the practices, customs and traditions of nomadic peoples that took place on the
land were integral to their distinctive cultures.64
This would appear to be a clear statement that non-sedentary Aboriginal
groups may be barred from proving Aboriginal title. Indeed, this
statement seems to imply that seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups
may be the paradigm of a group unable to prove Aboriginal title.
Of course, the other point of Lamer C.J.C.'s statement is that
while they may be restricted from a claim to Aboriginal title,
seasonally-nomadic groups will not be precluded from proving one or
more site-specific rights upon the land they historically frequented. This,
however, is cold comfort. As has been repeatedly emphasized,
site-specific rights are narrowly constructed, conferring only the right to
exercise, upon a specific tract of land, the modern equivalent of a
custom, practice, or tradition proven to have been an integral part of the
distinctive culture of the group before the time of contact. A finding of
Aboriginal title, on the other hand, gives the successful group the right
to do virtually anything upon the land short of committing acts akin to
equitable waste. The two rights, therefore, are miles apart in terms of
their content.
But would barring seasonally-nomadic groups from claiming
Aboriginal title constitute an injustice? This will depend upon two things:
first, our definition of justice; second, our concept of what it is that
62 See A.D. McMillan, Native Peoples and Cultures of Canada, 2d ed. (Vancouver: Douglas &
McIntyre, 1995) at 51-52; and V.P. Miller, "The Micmac: A Maritime Woodland Group" in
Morrison & Wilson, eds., supra note 51, 347 at 349-54.
63 See, for example, Miller, supra note 62 at 349.
6 4 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1095 [emphasis added].
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makes a group deserving of a claim to Aboriginal title. One fairly
conventional philosophical definition of justice is that posited by William
Frankena: "[J]ustice is treating persons equally, except as unequal
treatment is required by ... principles of justice ... of substantial weight
in the circumstances." 65 If we accept this definition, we must then
determine whether the unequal treatment of seasonally-nomadic
groups-that is, excluding them from Aboriginal title, and restricting
them to site-specific rights-is treatment that is required (or, perhaps,
sanctioned) by principles of justice of substantial weight. The key to
answering this question lies in locating what I will term the Supreme
Court's "theoretical rationale" for granting Aboriginal title to certain
groups, but not others. By theoretical rationale I mean the justification
underlying the granting of Aboriginal title; what a group must
demonstrate in order to establish that it is deserving of the broad
conferral flowing from a finding of title. If a group does not meet this
theoretical rationale, it follows that barring the group from Aboriginal
title-to paraphrase Frankena, treating the group differently or
unequally from other Aboriginal groups-will be sanctioned by
principles of justice of substantial weight (assuming, of course, that the
theoretical rationale is defensible as a principle of justice), and hence
will not be unjust.
What, then, is the Supreme Court's theoretical rationale
underpinning the doctrine of Aboriginal title? A statement of what
appears to be this rationale is found in the following passage from
Delgamuukw: "[A]lthough aboriginal title is a species of aboriginal right
recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), it is distinct from other aboriginal
rights because it arises where the connection of a group with a piece of land
'was of a central significance to their distinctive culture .... "66
From this passage, it is clear that the Supreme Court will grant
Aboriginal title only to those groups for whom a piece of land was,
historically, of central significance to their distinctive culture. Put
negatively, the Supreme Court will deny Aboriginal title to those groups
for whom a piece of land was not, historically, centrally significant. A
piece of land being of central significance to the culture of the group in
question, then, appears to be the theoretical rationale behind granting
Aboriginal title. And, since the Supreme Court seems to use
seasonally-nomadic peoples as the exemplar of a group that may not be
65 W.K. Frankena, "The Concept of Social Justice" in R. Brandt, ed., Social Justice
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962) 1 at 10.
6 6 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1094 [emphasis added]. Chief Justice Lamer is paraphrasing a
longer passage from Adams, where he makes the same point: seeAdams,supra note 20 at 117-18.
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able to claim Aboriginal title, it follows that the Supreme Court must
believe that a piece of land for these peoples was not, historically, of
central significance to their distinctive cultures. 67 That is, in the Supreme
Court's view these peoples do not meet the theoretical rationale
underlying Aboriginal title.
But is it truly the case that, merely because an Aboriginal group
moved its settlement with the seasons, it did not have a centrally
significant relationship with a piece of land? The answer to this question
will, of course, depend upon the group looked to. But if we recall the
anthropological evidence relating to the Micmac, it is not at all evident
that a piece of land was not of central significance to Micmac culture.
Indeed, quite the opposite appears to be the case. The Micmac did not
amble randomly from one location to the next. Instead, they returned
time after time to the same seasonal camp sites. As such, the territory
they traversed was not unlimited and forever changing, but was confined
within more or less static boundaries. A relatively clearly circumscribed
area of land, then, was crucial and central to the Micmac culture.
If this argument is accepted, then it would seem to follow that
certain seasonally-nomadic groups do meet the theoretical rationale for
granting Aboriginal title. And yet these groups might, because of their
historical manner of living, be barred from proving such title. If so, they
will be limited to proving entitlement to site-specific rights. But, again,
site-specific rights give a claimant far less than a finding of Aboriginal
title. Returning to our modified definition of justice, since
seasonally-nomadic groups that enjoyed a close historical relationship
with a piece of land may be treated differently or unequally from other
Aboriginal groups (in that they seem to be barred from Aboriginal title
and restricted to site-specific rights), and as there is no principle of
justice of substantial weight to justify such differential treatment (since
they, too, can meet the theoretical rationale behind Aboriginal title), it
follows that the Supreme Court's doctrine of Aboriginal title does seem
to treat certain seasonally-nomadic groups unjustly. These groups, that
is, fall into a "gap" in the doctrine of Aboriginal title. It is towards
finding a solution that closes this gap in the doctrine of Aboriginal title
that we shall turn in the final part of this article.
67 Chief Justice Lamer's statement in Delgamuukw that certain practices, customs, and
traditions may have been integral to the distinctive cultures of seasonally-nomadic peoples (for
which they can claim site-specific rights) bears out this interpretation: see note 64, supra, and
accompanying text. The implication is that a piece of land was not integral to the distinctive cultures
of seasonally-nomadic groups.
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IV. FILLING IN THE "GAP" IN THE DOCTRINE
OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
The final part of this article consists of an attempt to correct the
injustice that certain seasonally-nomadic groups may face in trying to
make out a claim for Aboriginal title. This may require some re-working
of the doctrine of Aboriginal title. In particular, the test of exclusive
occupation must be re-examined since it is this test that, on an
operational level, has to be met for a group to establish an Aboriginal
title claim. But since the doctrine of Aboriginal title, taken as a whole, is
a fine piece of judicial creation, the goal is to correct the gap without
destroying the doctrine in its entirety.
A. Some Problems with the Exclusive Occupation Test
Before commencing our re-examination of the doctrine of
Aboriginal title, an important preliminary point must be addressed.
Perhaps the Supreme Court's statement in Delgamuukw suggesting that
seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups may be unable to prove title was a
mere oversight, arising because the facts in that case did not lend
themselves to clear meditation on the validity of that assertion. If it was
a mere oversight, then there is no real "gap" in the doctrine-just a
misunderstanding. And this misunderstanding can be cleared up by the
courts when seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups come to litigate their
claims.
If this was indeed a simple oversight on the part of the Supreme
Court, then so much the better for seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal
groups. I would suggest, though, that, for better or worse, statements
made by Canada's highest court cannot be taken so lightly. Instead, they
must be assumed to represent the Supreme Court's stance on the matter,
and addressed squarely and openly on that footing.
Assuming, then, that the Supreme Court of Canada indeed
believes that seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups may be unable to
prove Aboriginal title, it would seem to follow that, since the test for
Aboriginal title is proof of exclusive occupation, the Supreme Court
must also believe that such groups cannot pass this test. Although there
has never been an express statement by the Supreme Court to this effect,
this is not an unnatural conclusion given that, in Delganuukw, the
Supreme Court both establishes the test of exclusive occupation and
suggests that seasonally-nomadic Aboriginals may be unable to make out
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a claim to Aboriginal title. In any event, for the reasons stated above,
this rather undesirable conclusion must be squarely addressed.
Our first step, therefore, must be to analyze carefully the
exclusive occupation test as it would apply to seasonally-nomadic groups.
The question to be considered is whether it is truly the case that no
seasonally-nomadic group would be able to meet the exclusive
occupation test. The first element of this test is proof of physical
occupation. It will be recalled that, in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. states
that physical occupation can be established in a number of ways.68 Four
examples of occupation are supplied by him. The first three-the
construction of dwellings, cultivation of the land, and the enclosure of
fields-are more Western than Aboriginal in nature, their underpinnings
located squarely in the common law tradition, and more distantly in the
philosophical writings of John Locke.69 The seasonally-nomadic
Aboriginal group discussed earlier-the Micmac-would probably be
unable to prove physical occupancy by these means; the group's
historical lifestyle, as described in anthropological literature, makes this
clear. The fourth example of proof of physical occupation provided by
Lamer C.J.C.-the regular use of well-defined tracts of land for hunting,
fishing, or otherwise exploiting the land's resources-is more promising.
As the anthropological evidence demonstrates, some seasonally-nomadic
Aboriginal groups indeed used fairly well-defined tracts of land for
hunting and fishing. It would appear, therefore, that such groups should
be able to meet the physical occupation branch of the exclusive
occupation test.70
The second part of the exclusive occupation test involves proof
that the physical occupation was exclusive at the time Crown sovereignty
was asserted. Chief Justice Lamer makes clear that both the common
68 See Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1101.
69 See, for instance, J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. by R.H. Cox (Arlington
Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1982), c. V, "Of Property."
70 This conclusion is bolstered by other statements made by Lamer C.J.C. in Delgamuukv. It
will be recalled that, in considering whether a group's occupation is sufficient to ground title, the
court must take into account the group's size, manner of life, material resources and technological
abilities, as well as the nature of the lands claimed. These elements would certainly assist
seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups in proving physical occupation. Take, for example, the
character of the lands claimed. It is quite possible that certain groups engaged in a
seasonally-nomadic lifestyle because the nature of the land they inhabited was not conducive to
sedentary living. If the food supply of these groups varied with the seasons, and each seasonal food
item was to be found in a different location, then the groups would have little choice but to follow
the food source. This strengthens the conclusion that meeting the physical occupation branch of the
exclusive occupation test would not be an insuperable barrier for certain seasonally-nomadic
Aboriginal groups.
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law and the Aboriginal perspective must be taken into account in this
respect: "[T]he test required to establish exclusive occupation must take
into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time of
sovereignty."71 As such, exclusive occupation can be made out even if
other Aboriginal groups frequented the claimed lands: "Under those
circumstances, exclusivity would be demonstrated by 'the intention and
capacity to retain exclusive control."'7 2
Applying this to the case of seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal
groups, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that some of these
groups could demonstrate exclusivity of occupation. Take, once again,
the example of the Micmac. The anthropological evidence indicates that
while the Micmac moved regularly with the seasons, their movements
were not arbitrary; good camp-sites were returned to annually. It seems
probable that the Micmac had exclusive occupation of these sites, at
least during that part of the year in which the sites were occupied. While
further anthropological evidence of the Micmac's intention and capacity
to retain exclusive control of these sites would be required to definitively
prove exclusive occupation, the point is that it seems quite possible that
some seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups could demonstrate the
requisite degree of exclusivity.
The foregoing "first principles" analysis makes clear that some
seisonally-nomadic groups should be able to succeed at the exclusive
occupation test. In Common Law Aboriginal Title-cited frequently by
Lamer C.J.C. in Delgamuukw-Kent McNeil comes to the same
conclusion with respect to nomadic hunter-gatherers. 73 In examining the
issue of the sufficiency of occupation required to ground Aboriginal title
to land, McNeil considers the case of a hypothetical group that
"wandered indiscriminately in search of food, water, and other
resources, without attachment to any particular area."7 4 Referring
extensively to the common law authorities on occupation, McNeil
concludes that such a group "probably ... could not be said to have been
71 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1104.
72 Ibid. Chief Justice Lamer adopts here a statement made in K. McNeil, Common Law
Aboriginal Tite (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 204 [hereinafter Common LavAbotiginal Title].
73 Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 72 at 202-04. For a more recent restatement of
McNeil's position that specifically addresses the Supreme Court's obiter statements that
seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal groups may be unable to prove Aboriginal title, see K. McNeil,
"Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 117 at
127-28.
74 Common LawAboriginal Title, supra note 72 at 202.
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in occupation of any lands they passed over." 75 McNeil notes, though,
that "modern anthropological research has revealed that few hunting
and gathering groups are indiscriminate wanderers." 76 On the contrary,
these groups tend to have attachments to defined areas. Moreover,
territorial bounds are known both to the group's members and members
of neighbouring groups, and permission for entry onto the group's
territories is often required. 77 From these and other considerations,
McNeil concludes as follows:
Applying the criteria for occupation outlined above, there can be little doubt that a group
of hunter-gatherers who habitually and exclusively ranged over a definite tract of land,
visiting religious sites and exploiting natural resources in accordance with their own
interests and way of life, would have been in occupation of that land. 78
What is the extent of the land that such a hunter-gatherer group
could be said to occupy? McNeil, citing numerous common law
authorities, addresses this point in the following manner:
As to the extent of their occupation, it would include not just land in actual use by them
at any given moment, but all larid within their habitual range, for occupation, once
acquired, is not necessarily lost by temporary absence (particularly if seasonal), so long as
the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control and return to the land continue, and
no one occupies it in the mean time. 79
These arguments make clear that there is no a priori reason why
a seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal group could not meet the exclusive
occupation test. Why, then, does the Supreme Court of Canada appear
to believe that such groups cannot pass this test? Perhaps the problem
lies in the Western-shaped conception of what "exclusive occupation"
can mean. It does seem somewhat foreign to the Western mind, given its
obsession with the efficient use of land,8 0 that a group that moved
seasonally could somehow "occupy" the whole of the land that made up
its seasonal rounds. In other words, the concept of exclusive occupation
can only be stretched so far-semantically and metaphysically-until,
from the traditional Western view, it no longer signifies its original
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. at 202-03. For an extensive and useful list of anthropological literature on the
territorial divisions of hunting and gathering societies, see ibid. at 203, n. 35.
77 Ibid. at 203.
7 8 Ibid. at 203-04.
79 Ibid. at 204 [emphasis added].
80 Consider the doctrine of adverse possession. One justification for this doctrine is that it
promotes the efficient use of land through punishment for non-use: see B. Ziff, Principles of Property
Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 119-20. Ziff criticizes this rationale for the doctrine.
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referent. While it might be objected that this is an esoteric point, it
nevertheless resolves itself into the following practical question: how far
can an Aboriginal group's historical land-use pattern actually stray from
the Western conception of what "exclusive occupation" means, yet still
resemble that concept sufficiently to lead a court to conclude that the
group exclusively occupied the land under dispute? The answer to this
question will depend, of course, upon how willing the court is to allow
the Aboriginal perspective to modify its preconception of what the
phrase "exclusive occupation" means. The Supreme Court's suggestion
that Aboriginal groups that moved the locations of their settlements with
the "seasons and changing circumstances" might be unable to make out
a claim to Aboriginal title should sound a warning bell, though, that
courts may not give the Aboriginal perspective sufficient weight in this
respect.
It is to be hoped that, should a claim by a seasonally-nomadic
group for Aboriginal title come before the Supreme Court in the future,
the Court will be open to the argument that, despite a seasonally-
nomadic life-style, the group might have indeed occupied the subject
lands in an exclusive manner. It is nonetheless possible, though, that the
Court will not expand its conception of "exclusive occupation" to the
degree necessary to accept that a seasonally-nomadic group could have
exclusively occupied land. That is, it may be the case that a narrow view
of the exclusive occupation test will deny seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal
groups the opportunity to establish Aboriginal title. While this is an
undesirable-and, I have argued, incorrect-result, the Supreme Court's
statements in Delgamuukw regarding seasonally-nomadic groups and
Aboriginal title force us to confront this possibility.
As has already been noted, though, exclusive occupation is
merely the test for Aboriginal title. It functions only as a proxy for the
theoretical rationale underpinning the granting of such title-a centrally
significant relationship with a piece of land. Thus, if it can be
demonstrated that certain Aboriginal groups do meet the theoretical
rationale for Aboriginal title, but are unable to pass the test for that
entitlement, then the test for Aboriginal title must be flawed, at least to
the extent that it bars such groups from entitlement to the right. Since
there appear to be some seasonally-nomadic groups that are able to
prove (or at least raise a strong argument) that a piece of land was of
central significance to their distinctive cultures, it follows that the
exclusive occupation test must be flawed, at least to the extent that it may
unjustly exclude deserving groups from a claim to Aboriginal title.
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B. A Possible Solution: Adoption of the Bundle Theory Test
It is important to note that the problem is not with the exclusive
occupation test per se, but rather its operation vis-4-vis seasonally-
nomadic groups. But if the exclusive occupation test may not operate to
enable seasonally-nomadic groups that enjoyed a very close connection
with a piece of land to claim Aboriginal title,8 1 what solution can be
found to remedy this problem? One promising solution would be the
adoption of a second test for proving Aboriginal title-a test that does
not require proof of exclusive occupation. More specifically, the solution
might lie in the adoption of what I have termed, borrowing from
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s dissenting judgment in Van der Peet, the "bundle
theory" test. This test, as formulated by L'Heureux Dub6 J., mainitains
that "aboriginal title exists when the bundle of aboriginal rights is large
enough to command the recognition of a sui generisproprietary interest to
occupy and use the land."8 2 We might expand the bundle theory test as
follows: if an Aboriginal group can prove a sufficient number of
site-specific rights upon a reasonably circumscribed parcel of land, the
group will be able to claim Aboriginal title over at least some of that
land. It is crucial to note that, under my formulation of this test, the
claimant group would not be restricted to exercising only those activities
that are themselves site-specific Aboriginal rights upon the Aboriginal
title land. Instead, upon meeting the bundle theory test, the group would
receive a declaration that it is entitled to use the land in the same,
almost unfettered, manner as a group proving Aboriginal title via the
exclusive occupation test.83 Under this new test it is quite possible that
seasonally-nomadic groups that may be unable to succeed at the
exclusive occupation test could, in the right circumstances, make out a
claim for Aboriginal title.
The test has a number of ancillary strengths, too. Most
important, the requirement that the group prove a sufficient number of
81 It must be re-emphasized that at least some seasonally-nomadic groups should be able to
meet the exclusive occupation test. The rest of this article, though, works on the assumption that,
for the reasons described above, a court will not expand its conception of "exclusive occupation" to
the degree necessary to accept that a seasonally-nomadic group could have exclusively occupied
land.
82 Van der Peet, supra note 6 at 580 [emphasis added].
83 It might appear strange that I am now advocating the adoption of the bundle theory test
when, earlier, I suggested a number of explanations why the Supreme Court of Canada decided to
reject the test in Delgamuukw. This seeming contradiction is explained below. For now, suffice it to
say that I believe the problems the Supreme Court saw with the bundle theory test were more
apparent than real.
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site-specific rights over a defined territory works to ensure that a
successful claimant group meets the theoretical rationale for Aboriginal
title; viz. that a piece of land was centrally significant to its culture. This
follows because if an Aboriginal group is able to demonstrate
entitlement to a large number of site-specific rights over a certain
territory, then surely it enjoyed a very intimate relationship with that
land.
Further, it will be recalled that, in considering whether there was
sufficient occupation to ground title under the exclusive occupation test,
the court must take into account the group's size, its manner of life,
material resources, and technological abilities, as well as the nature of
the lands claimed. It has been argued that these considerations-which
help import an Aboriginal element into the test of exclusive
occupation-can only assist a claimant seasonally-nomadic group to a
certain degree; specifically, to the degree that a court allows these
considerations to expand its conception of what "exclusive occupation"
can mean. The bundle theory test, on the other hand, provides a way of
ensuring that the group's size, its style of living, and the nature of the
land it inhabited are given meaningful consideration in a claim for
Aboriginal title. In effect, each of these variables is automatically
factored into the analysis of the geographic pattern and concentration of
the site-specific rights that the group will attempt to prove in grounding
its claim to Aboriginal title.
Finally, the adoption of the bundle theory test accords with an
often-stated rule regarding the construction of the Aboriginal rights
enshrined by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982: these rights are
to be given a generous, large, and liberal interpretation. 4 Since the
bundle theory test works to correct a possible injustice in the doctrine of
Aboriginal title-the exclusion of certain worthy groups from the
doctrine's purview-its adoption as a second test for Aboriginal title is in
harmony with the purpose and scope of section 35(1).
C. Possible Objections to, and Refinements of, the Bundle Theory Test
There are a number of objections that can be levelled against the
adoption of the bundle theory as a test for Aboriginal title. It will be
argued that none of these objections are insuperable. Further, the
84 For a recent expression of this rule, see Lamer C.J.C's comments in Van derPeet, supra note
6 at 536.
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objections play a salutary role; they help refine the test into a more
workable state.
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the adoption of the
bundle theory test is the fact that the majority of the Supreme Court
explicitly rejects it, in Delgamuukw, in favour of the exclusive occupation
test. As I argued earlier, though, the bundle theory's rejection seemed to
result from a perceived methodological problem; namely, that it is
impossible to add up any sized bundle of site-specific Aboriginal rights
(as those have been defined by the Supreme Court) and attain a sum
that will confer an almost unlimited use of the land in the grant of
Aboriginal title. There would always be unwanted "breaks" in the uses
conferred under that title. It might seem surprising, then, that I am
advocating the adoption of the bundle theory test. The reply to this,
however, is that the methodological problem noted is more apparent
than real. Indeed, the problem disappears once it is accepted that there
is no need to actually arithmetically add up the various site-specific rights
and have that sum constitute the entitlement. Instead, the bundle theory
test would operate such that if a group could prove a sufficient number
of site-specific rights concentrated in a reasonably circumscribed
geographic area, the court would simply grant the same entitlement that
would flow to a group proving Aboriginal title under the exclusive
occupation test. This simple expedient eliminates the force of this
objection to the test's adoption. While it might be argued that such a
result is a "fiction," it is no more of a fiction than many other
jurisprudential mechanisms used to attain a given result.
Another objection might be that, if the bundle theory test is
accepted as part of the doctrine of Aboriginal title, almost any
Aboriginal group, regardless of historical connection with the land, will
be able to prove such an entitlement. The reply to this objection is
obvious. As I have formulated the test, only those groups that can prove
a sufficient number of site-specific rights upon a reasonably circumscribed
parcel of land will be able to claim Aboriginal title. This excludes from
Aboriginal title those groups that can prove only a handful of
site-specific Aboriginal rights upon a given territory, as well as those that
can prove a large number of site-specific rights, but these over a vast,
non-contiguous span of geography. These groups would, quite properly,
be restricted to their site-specific rights-the correct result since their
tenuous connection to any reasonably well-defined piece of land means
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(unless it is simply a problem of proof) that a specific piece of land was
not of central significance to their culture.85
Admittedly, the requirement of proving a "sufficient number" of
site-specific rights upon a "reasonably circumscribed" parcel of land
needs some fine-tuning, but it is readily understandable. Moreover,
fleshing out such terms as "sufficient" and "reasonable" is not a task
foreign to the courts. On the contrary, determinations of this nature are
made daily in diverse areas of the law. Additionally, the court can find
guidance in-interpreting what constitutes a "sufficient" number of
site-specific rights over a "reasonably circumscribed" parcel of land by
calling to mind the theoretical rationale underlying a grant of Aboriginal
title: that a piece of land was of central significance to the claimant
group's culture. Although reasoning this way might appear circular, the
use of any test as a proxy to meet a broader, theoretical rationale will
involve circularity. Calling to mind the theoretical rationale will, at the
very least, help the court maintain its focus on what it is that the test is
supposed to prove.
Another objection to this test involves the issue of timing, and
might run as follows: the bundle theory test, as I have formulated it,
requires the court to find a certain concentration of site-specific rights to
ground Aboriginal title. The doctrine of site-specific rights, as developed
by the Supreme Court, requires the court to look to the time before
contact in identifying the right. Conversely, the doctrine of Aboriginal
title mandates that the court look to the situation at the time Crown
sovereignty was asserted over the land. Thus, since the bundle theory
test looks to site-specific rights to prove Aboriginal title, there is an
irresolvable confusion in the timing issue.
This objection would appear to have some merit but, once the
purpose of the differential in the timing requirements is understood, its
force disappears. It will be recalled that Lamer C.J.C. provides two
reasons in Delgamuukw for setting the timing requirement under
Aboriginal title at the time the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land,
as opposed to the period before contact approach used for site-specific
Aboriginal rights. First, since "the Crown did not gain this title until it
asserted sovereignty over the land," it "does not make sense to speak of
a burden on the underlying title before that title existed." 86 Thus, the
85 This is not to suggest that land itself was not of central significance to the cultures of such
groups; clearly, it was. However, the Supreme Court's Aboriginal title doctrine demands that an
Aboriginal group prove a close connection to a specific piece of land. It is from the viewpoint of this
requirement that my suggestion is the "correct result."
86 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 1098.
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time sovereignty was asserted makes more sense from the point of view
of logic. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, sovereignty is
the proper time because "aboriginal title does not raise the problem of
distinguishing between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs
and traditions and those influenced or introduced by European
contact."8 7
If we apply these two principles to the issue at hand, several
things become clear. First, from a logical point of view, any test for
Aboriginal title ought to regard the time at which Crown sovereignty was
asserted over the land as the proper point to look to. Second, although
the bundle theory test, as I have formulated it, involves proving site-
specific rights upon the land in question, it does so only as aproxy for
determining whether there was a sufficient connection between the
claimant group and the land. It is a good proxy simply because it involves
a doctrine already developed by the Supreme Court, and because it is a
reliable way of ensuring that only those groups that had a strong
historical connection with a piece of land are able to prove Aboriginal
title. And it does not, it will be recalled, mean that the group will be
restricted to exercising only those activities that are themselves
site-specific Aboriginal rights upon the Aboriginal title land. But, if all
this is true, then there is no need to set the time the court looks to in
finding site-specific rights under the bundle theory test at the point
immediately before European contact because, in the words of Lamer
C.J.C., "aboriginal title does not raise the problem of distinguishing
between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions
and those influenced or introduced by European contact."8 8 That a
custom, tradition, or practice taking place upon land was introduced
after the arrival of the Europeans is therefore irrelevant when trying to
prove Aboriginal title via the bundle theory test. Thus, under this test,
although the court is to look for certain concentrations of site-specific
rights, it can safely look to the point at which the Crown asserted
sovereignty over the land in locating these rights. It follows that the
timing requirement under the Van der Peet test for site-specific
Aboriginal rights (i.e., when a claimant is trying to prove those rights
only) will be different from the timing requirement utilized by a group
attempting to prove site-specific rights in order to ground Aboriginal
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clear, this difference does not involve an inconsistency. Rather, it is
dictated by common sense and the Supreme Court's own statements.
A further objection to the bundle theory test might be that it
leaves uncertain what territory will be granted to a successful claimant of
Aboriginal title by way of that test. Would a seasonally-nomadic group
that could prove a sufficient number of site-specific rights over a certain
parcel of land attain title to the whole of the land even though,
historically, it occupied only a certain quadrant of the land each season?
In this regard, La Forest J.'s suggestion in Delgamuukw that the drawing
of exact territorial limits can be settled by negotiations between the
Aboriginal group and the government seems appropriate.8 9
A final objection might be that the bundle theory test will
complicate, or even ruin, the doctrine of Aboriginal title. The reply to
this is that the bundle theory test would operate alongside, not in
substitution of, the exclusive occupation test. The revised doctrine would
operate precisely as it did before, except that the bundle theory test
would provide an alternative route for a title claim to those groups (such
as certain seasonally-nomadic peoples) that, despite meeting the
theoretical rationale for Aboriginal title, may be unable to pass the
exclusive occupation test. The bundle theory test thus corrects the
potential injustice arising under the current doctrine of Aboriginal title.
In other words, it fills in the gap in that doctrine.
D. A Recapitulation of the Bundle Theory Test
A brief summation of the bundle theory test is in order, as the
objections discussed above have shaped the test into a more
sophisticated form. The test can be summarized as follows: An
Aboriginal group that is able to prove a sufficient number of site-specific
rights (looking for these rights at the time the Crown asserted
sovereignty over the land, not at the point before European contact)
upon a reasonably circumscribed geographic area is entitled to a finding
of Aboriginal title. The uses allowed on the title lands would be the
same, nearly unlimited, ones granted upon proof of title under the
exclusive occupation test. The number of site-specific rights necessary to
prove such title cannot be stated in the abstract, but will be a function of
the concentration of those rights over the geographic area in question.
The boundaries of the parcel of land to be conferred could be resolved
through negotiations between the Aboriginal group in question and the
89 lbia- at 1129.
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various levels of government that stand to be affected by the declaration
of title.
V. CONCLUSION
Certain statements made by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Adams and Delgamuukw suggest that seasonally-nomadic Aboriginal
groups may be unable to prove Aboriginal title. A careful examination of
the exclusive occupation test as it would apply to seasonally-nomadic
groups indicates, though, that some of these groups should indeed be
able to establish exclusive occupation. Nonetheless, courts may be
unwilling or unable to expand their preconception of what "exclusive
occupation" can mean to the extent necessary to include within that
concept's ambit the land-use patterns of seasonally-nomadic groups.
This possibility must be squarely faced. If that is the case, then, under
the present doctrine of Aboriginal title, these groups will be unable to
prove title and will be left only with claims for site-specific rights upon
the lands over which they historically moved. But, despite the suggestion
of a gentle ascension of entitlements inherent in the Supreme Court's
"spectrum" analogy of the Aboriginal rights protected under section
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, site-specific rights confer
dramatically fewer benefits than does Aboriginal title. And there may be
some seasonally-nomadic groups, such as the Micmac, that could meet
the theoretical rationale underlying the doctrine of Aboriginal title;
namely, that the land claimed was, historically, of central importance to
their distinctive cultures. To restrict such groups to proving only
site-specific rights when they deserve the broader entitlements flowing
from a declaration of Aboriginal title creates an injustice. The bundle
theory test aims to correct this injustice, or gap, in the doctrine of
Aboriginal title. It functions as an additional test, conferring title upon
those groups that can prove a sufficient number of site-specific rights on
a reasonably circumscribed geographic area at the time the Crown
asserted sovereignty over the land. The test ensures that, in accordance
with the theoretical rationale underlying Aboriginal title, all Aboriginal
groups that enjoyed a very strong relationship with a piece of land are
entitled to a declaration of title. As such, the bundle theory test fills in
the gap in Aboriginal title, making the doctrine more fair for all worthy
Aboriginal claimants, regardless of their historical manner of living.
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